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The European Union is moving toward adoption of its new Registration, Evaluation and 
Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) policy, an innovative system of chemicals regulation that 
will provide crucial information on the safety profile of chemicals used in industry. Chemicals 
produced elsewhere, such as in the United States, and exported to Europe will have to meet the 
same standards as chemicals produced within the European Union. What is at stake for the U.S. 
is substantial: we estimate that chemical exports to Europe that are subject to REACH amount to 
about $14 billion per year, and are directly and indirectly responsible for 54,000 jobs. Revenues 
and employment of this magnitude dwarf the costs of compliance with REACH, which will 
amount to no more than $14 million per year. Even if, as the U.S. chemicals industry has argued, 
REACH is a needless mistake, it will be far more profitable to pay the modest compliance costs 





The European Union (EU) is moving toward adoption of an innovative system of 
chemicals regulation that will provide crucial information on the safety profile of chemicals used 
in industry. After several years of development, debate, and amendment, the EU’s new 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) policy is expected to take 
effect in 2006 or early 2007. Chemicals produced elsewhere, such as those produced in the U.S., 
and exported to Europe will have to meet the same standards as chemicals produced within the 
European Union.  
 
Will REACH harm American industry, imposing expensive new regulatory burdens on 
its exports? The chemical industry on both sides of the Atlantic initially argued strongly against 
REACH; but as the debate has continued, American firms have been slower to accept REACH 
than their European counterparts. In the U.S., moreover, industry complaints about REACH have 
been echoed by the federal government.  
  
This report presents a different perspective, reviewing estimates of the surprisingly low 
cost of compliance with REACH, and arguing that U.S. producers are far better off paying these 
costs and retaining access to European markets. U.S. exporters have faced similar dilemmas in 
the past, with genetically modified crops, and with beef following mad cow disease scares. 
Unfortunately, experience has shown that it is possible to lose foreign markets quite rapidly by 
ignoring foreign regulations and concerns about health, safety and the environment. 
 
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Samuel Bell and Jessica Katz. 
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What is at stake for the U.S. is substantial: we estimate that chemical exports to Europe 
that are subject to REACH amount to $13.7 billion per year, and are directly or indirectly 
responsible for 54,000 jobs. Revenues and employment of this magnitude dwarf the costs of 
compliance with REACH, which will amount to no more than a few million dollars per year. 
Even if industry remains convinced that REACH is a needless mistake, it will be far more 




Background: What is REACH? 
 
REACH is intended to revamp chemicals regulation in the EU, replacing a complicated 
set of more than 40 interlocking regulations with a single piece of legislation. REACH closes 
loopholes that have existed in European chemicals regulation for years and lays out a series of 
requirements for collecting, systematizing and using information about the health and 
environmental and health effects of industrial chemicals.  
 
REACH has three main components. Under the registration provision, chemical 
manufacturers and importers are required to carry out health and environmental safety tests on 
their products; exact testing protocols depend on the volume at which a chemical is sold in the 
EU, with the highest volume chemicals subject to the most stringent testing requirements. The 
results of these tests are registered with a central regulatory agency. In registering a chemical, the 
manufacturer or importer is responsible for specifying safe conditions of use and appropriate risk 
management techniques for each known use of the chemical. In the evaluation phase, EU 
member States evaluate the information provided in the registration phase and assess the hazards 
associated with each chemical. Substances of particularly high concern are subject to 
authorization, meaning that they can be used only with special permission. This includes 
chemicals that cause cancer, genetic mutations, or birth defects, as well as substances that are 
persistent and bioaccumulative. Finally, as a safety net in case a substance is not adequately 
controlled through these measures, REACH also allows for restriction of substances that pose 
unacceptable risks to health or the environment. Restrictions can take the form of risk 
management measures, or partial or complete bans.
2
 
Under the EU chemicals policy that prevailed prior to REACH, chemicals that were on 
the market in 1981 – so-called “existing” chemicals – were not routinely subject to testing 
requirements. Chemicals that entered the market after 1981, in contrast, were subject to extensive 
safety testing. The vast majority of the chemicals used in industry, however, are the “existing” 
ones; chemicals that are new since 1981, and were therefore tested, account for a very small part 
of total chemicals use. Before REACH, the burden of proof was on government agencies to 
demonstrate that an “existing” chemical was harmful. Under REACH, the system is streamlined 
and the burden of proof is reversed: companies are responsible for providing the data to support a 
claim of safety. Traditional regulation has assumed that chemicals are innocent until proven 
 
2 For a more detailed description of REACH, see the website for the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_intro.htm. 
    2 
 GDAE Working Paper No. 06-06: European Chemical Policy and the United States 
 
 
guilty; REACH will assume that chemicals, especially when used in large volume, are suspect 
until their supplier proves them innocent. 
 
 
A litany of complaints 
 
In the U.S., both the federal government and the chemical industry have been actively 
involved in efforts to influence the implementation of REACH. U.S. government involvement 
has included high-level communications from State Department officials, distribution of policy 
papers, and formal statements on possible implications of REACH for global trade. In parallel, 
U.S. industry associations, notably the American Chemistry Council (ACC), have engaged in 
direct and indirect lobbying of EU officials, and have expressed grave concerns about the 
potentially dire effects of REACH. In some cases ACC has gone so far as to argue that European 
business will lose competitive advantage in relation to the U.S. as a result of REACH – an odd 
concern for the trade association of an industry that competes with Europe (CGR April 2004). 
 
The official U.S. stance on REACH has prompted a series of protests from both U.S. 
health and environmental advocacy networks, and members of Congress. Critics argue that the 
U.S. government’s arguments have generally used industry analyses wholesale, without 
interpretation, corrections, or independent analysis. Second, many observers think that U.S. 
government officials have overstepped the bounds of normal diplomatic communication and 
have meddled inappropriately in the EU’s internal process of policy development.  
 
Some U.S. government responses to REACH have been overt, while others were 
clandestine at the time that they occurred. Thanks to Freedom of Information Act requests by the 
Environmental Health Fund – a U.S.-based advocacy group – and by the office of U.S. 
Representative Henry Waxman (Democrat-California), there is now clear documentation of 
communications by U.S. government officials regarding REACH.  
 
As summarized in a report by Representative Waxman’s office, Bush Administration 
officials met repeatedly with representatives of the U.S. chemicals industry to develop a position 
on REACH. Goals identified in consultation with industry included the possibility of “educating” 
other countries so that they could join the U.S. in raising concerns about REACH. In March 
2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell cabled U.S. diplomatic posts with instructions to “raise the 
EU chemicals policy with relevant government officials” and to object to REACH as “costly, 
burdensome, and complex.” The Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the 
Mediterranean invited U.S. chemical companies to develop “themes” for the U.S. government to 
cite in its communications with EU officials regarding REACH. Secretary of State Powell used 
these themes – including calls for more in-depth cost/benefit analyses, as well as concerns about 
REACH’s potential to harm small and medium-sized businesses and to stifle innovation – in a 
second cable to diplomatic posts in Europe, again urging them to express concern about REACH 
(CGR April 2004). 
 
US government officials also actively worked to generate opposition to REACH within 
Europe. Their efforts included, for example, visits by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
officials (together with ACC representatives) to European government and business 
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representatives. Formal comments filed by the U.S. with the European Commission in 2003 
expressed the usual set of concerns, including the possibility of high implementation costs and 
decreased innovation (CGR April 2004). In addition, U.S. agencies circulated chemical industry 
claims that exports to the EU would be halted by REACH (DiGangi 2004). 
 
While many of the same criticisms of REACH were also advocated by some European 
stake-holders, the efforts of the Bush Administration and the ACC may have helped to shift the 
balance of European discourse. The final REACH proposal, published in October 2003, reflected 
many of the specific changes for which the U.S. had advocated, including exclusion of polymers, 
less regulation of intermediates, and looser requirements regarding chemicals found in products. 
The European Commission also bowed to U.S. pressure in agreeing to present a new impact 
assessment of REACH (CGR April 2004). Varying assessments of the cost of implementing 
REACH have played a major role in the final stages of the REACH debate.  
 
Most recently, in June 2006, the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to the EU organized a joint 
statement of the Missions of Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Singapore, South Africa and Thailand in which they ask the European Parliament to 
reconsider the implementation of REACH. The joint statement argues that REACH regulation 
and implementation procedures are opaque, that REACH has the potential to disrupt 
international trade, and that developing countries in particular will be harmed by REACH (U.S. 
Diplomatic Mission to the European Union 2006). As demonstrated in the next two sections, the 
U.S. government’s keen interest in quashing REACH seems particularly strange when its small 




US exports subject to REACH 
 
Estimates of billions of dollars of U.S. exports lost as a result of REACH are surely 
mistaken. There is no need for any loss of exports, beyond the small number of substances found 
to be truly hazardous, if U.S. companies comply with REACH. It is true, however, that billions 
of dollars of U.S. exports will be subject to REACH, and that exporters will be required to 
comply with its regulations. 
 
How much is at stake, in terms of sales revenue and employment? The categories of 
chemicals subject to REACH do not correspond exactly to the data on exports and imports; there 
is no official figure available. We have developed an estimate, based on U.S. trade and 
employment data, and our reading of REACH. Our national estimate, in brief, is that U.S. 
exports subject to REACH amounted to $13.7 billion in 2004, and were directly or indirectly 
responsible for 54,000 jobs. Our study is limited to 43 states because data were incomplete for 
Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont (states with very 
limited chemical production). In addition, Puerto Rico is not included because its large chemicals 
industry consists almost entirely of pharmaceuticals production, which is not regulated under 
REACH. In addition, our study only includes U.S. exports of chemicals subject to REACH and 
not the export of articles that contain these chemicals. The inclusion of articles containing 
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chemicals subject to REACH would increase our estimates of the value of REACH exports and 
the number of jobs related to these exports. 
 
The building blocks of our estimate are as follows (for a more detailed description of our 
methodology, see Appendix A; state-by-state results for each of these calculations can be found 
in Appendix B): 
 
A. Only about half of chemical industry output consists of substances regulated by 
REACH. Pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals are covered by other European 
regulations, and polymers (plastics) are also exempt. U.S. production of “REACH 
chemicals” – that is, chemicals that fall under REACH – in the 43 states amounted to 
$234 billion in 2004. 
 
B. About 6 percent of all U.S. chemical industry output is exported to the EU. We assume 
that the same percentage applies to the $234 billion of REACH chemicals in 2004, that is, 
that about 6 percent of U.S. REACH chemical output is exported to the EU. We 
confirmed this rough national estimate by doing the corresponding calculations state-by-
state, using state-specific data, and then adding the results; we rely on the state-by-state 
calculation for our final estimate. 
 
C. To calculate the number of jobs, we started with the 848,000 employees in the 
chemical industry in the 43 states as of 2004. We assumed, based on the estimates 
described above, that about half of them produce REACH chemicals, and 6 percent of 
those are producing chemicals for export to the EU. That yields the number of jobs in 
direct employment for exports subject to REACH.  
 
D. An input-output study of U.S. exports estimated that total (direct plus indirect) 
employment related to chemical exports is 1.85 times direct employment. We applied this 
multiplier to obtain the total employment dependent on exports subject to REACH. 
Again, we did the corresponding calculation state by state, using state-specific multipliers 
and employment data, and then added the results, yielding a slightly different number 
than implied by the national totals.  
 
The U.S. chemical industry has been expanding in recent years in exactly the areas 
affected by REACH. From 2002 to 2004, U.S. exports of REACH chemicals to the EU grew by 
37 percent in the 43 states, from 39,000 jobs and $10.2 billion in value, to almost 54,000 jobs 
and $13.7 billion in value. Three-quarters of this increase in jobs was in six states, with 
Massachusetts by itself accounting for 39 percent of the total job growth (see Table 1).  
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2002 2004 Growth 2002 2004 Growth
Massachusetts 3,444 9,110 5,666  $598 $1,581 $983
Texas 3,609 4,871 1,262  $1,792 $2,418 $626
California 5,137 6,326 1,189  $788 $971 $183
Illinois 1,805 2,865 1,060  $540 $856 $316
Minnesota 739 1,636 897  $92 $204 $112
Ohio 1,845 2,614 769  $386 $547 $161
43 states 39,284 53,778 14,494 $10,169 $13,716 $3,547
(number of employees) (millions)
Table 1: Exports of REACH chemicals from fast-growing states: 2004 vs. 2002
Direct and Indirect Employment Value of Shipments
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix A for data sources. 
 
While these exports of REACH chemicals to the EU are not a large fraction of the U.S. 
economy, or even of the nation’s total exports, they have been growing at an impressive rate.  
And the importance of export markets will only grow in the future, as the massive U.S. trade 
deficit and long-term weakness of the dollar will become increasingly difficult for economic 
policymakers to ignore.  
 
 
States where exports of REACH chemicals are most important 
 
REACH’s impact on the U.S. chemical industry is by no means equally distributed across 
the 43 states in our study. Table 2 lists the states where exports of REACH chemicals to the EU 
are most important, ranked by four criteria: total jobs, share of state employment, total value of 
exports, and exports as a share of state economic output.
3 Massachusetts, California, Texas, 
Illinois, Ohio, and New Jersey lead in terms of total REACH-related jobs, and also have a large 
volume of REACH exports. Other states where REACH accounts for a relatively high proportion 
of state employment include Kentucky, South Carolina, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and 
Tennessee (see Table 2). 
 
                                                 
3 Output is measured by gross state product (GSP), the state equivalent of gross domestic product (GDP) for a 
country as a whole. 
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Massachusetts 9,110 Massachusetts 0.29% Texas $2,418 Massachusetts 0.50%
California 6,330 Kentucky 0.11% Massachusetts $1,581 Louisiana 0.43%
Texas 4,870 South Carolina 0.10% California $971 West Virginia 0.41%
Illinois 2,860 Rhode Island 0.08% Illinois $856 Kentucky 0.35%
Ohio 2,610 West Virginia 0.08% New Jersey $714 Texas 0.27%
New Jersey 2,470 Tennessee 0.07% New York $710 Mississippi 0.21%
Michigan 2,200 New Jersey 0.06% Louisiana $651 South Carolina 0.19%
Kentucky 1,950 Minnesota 0.06% Georgia $575 Indiana 0.18%
South Carolina 1,880 Mississippi 0.05% Ohio $547 New Jersey 0.17%
Tennessee 1,850 Texas 0.05% Kentucky $477 Georgia 0.17%
Georgia 1,830 Michigan 0.05% Indiana $405 Illinois 0.16%
New York 1,690 Illinois 0.05% Michigan $355 Wyoming 0.16%
Minnesota 1,640 Ohio 0.05% Tennessee $347 Tennessee 0.16%
Indiana 1,080 Georgia 0.05% Missouri $313 Missouri 0.15%
Missouri 1,020 Louisiana 0.05% Virginia $274 Ohio 0.13%
Value of Shipments 
(millions)
Value of Shipments as a 
% of GSP
Table 2: States where REACH exports to EU are most important (2004 data): four rankings
Direct and Indirect Jobs
Direct and Indirect Jobs as a 
% of Total Employment
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix A for data sources. 
 
 
Costs of paying for REACH versus losing REACH-exports  
 
The expected costs of implementing REACH have been debated extensively in the course 
of policy development within Europe, and a number of studies have been commissioned to 
estimate the likely costs to industry of testing and registering chemicals. Some studies look only 
at the “direct” costs: the actual outlay of funds required to complete the tests, analyze the results 
and submit the registration documents. Other studies also attempt to estimate “indirect” costs: the 
broader effects of a possible increase in the cost of chemicals.  
 
There is broad, order-of-magnitude agreement on the size of the direct costs of testing 
and registering chemicals – and that cost turns out to be several orders of magnitude smaller than 
the value of the jobs and sales revenues that are at stake. The most recent estimate by the 
European Commission puts the direct costs of REACH at €2.3 billion over eleven years 
(European Commission 2003).(Earlier estimates were somewhat higher because they built in 
provisions that have since been eliminated from the regulation, such as testing and registration of 
polymers.) Our own estimate, with slightly different assumptions, yields an 11-year cost of about 
€3.5 billion, or roughly one-tenth of one percent of sales revenue per year (Ackerman and 
Massey 2004). 
 
For U.S. chemicals producers – assuming that the cost of complying with REACH is the 
same percentage of sales in the U.S. as it is in the EU – a cost increase of one-tenth of one 
percent of REACH exports would amount to additional costs of $14 million annually, or $250 
per affected job per year. It would cost Massachusetts, for example, $2.3 million per year to 
retain its 9,000 chemical industry jobs. That’s compared to an annual state budget of $38 billion 
(U.S. Census 2004). 
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Many states’ budgets include hundreds of dollars in workforce development per existing 
job in that state; these funds are earmarked for attracting new jobs, retaining old ones and 
training workers for new careers. For example, the total budget of Massachusetts’ Department of 
Workforce Development is $2 billion for 2007, which includes both job placement and 
workforce training programs; that’s $625 for every existing job in Massachusetts (State of MA 
2006). Similarly, California spends $760 on workforce development per existing job (State of 
CA 2006).  
 
The use of REACH-level testing and registration standards by U.S. chemical companies – 
even if only for those products being exported to the EU – also has potential health and 
occupation safety benefits. While no estimate of these benefits exists for the U.S., several studies 
have tried to estimate the benefits of REACH in the EU. While varying widely in methodology, 
most have found that partial estimates of the benefits of REACH range into the billions of euros, 




The high price of ignoring foreign standards 
 
As a number of studies have documented, compliance with REACH is not expensive, but 
it will be essential to retain European chemical sales. Recent experience has shown that it is all 
too possible for the U.S. to lose access to export markets, based on failure to meet environmental 
standards and to respond to concerns in the countries that buy American goods. 
 
One cautionary tale is provided by genetically modified (GM) corn. Bt corn, a variety of 
genetically-modified corn developed in the 1980s, won its first regulatory approvals in 1992 and 
burst onto the market in the mid-1990s. (The Bt gene is added to corn in order to repel insect 
pests, potentially reducing requirements for insecticide applications.) From 1.4 percent of U.S. 
planted area in 1996, Bt corn rose rapidly to 32 percent in 2004 (Ackerman, Wise et al. 2003; 
Nadal and Wise 2004).
5 European consumers have strongly rejected genetically-modified food of 
any variety, however, and U.S. exporters are not able to reliably separate traditional from 
genetically-modified corn. U.S. corn exports to the EU were above $100 million per year in the 
early 1990s but essentially vanished within a year or two after the large-scale introduction of 
genetically-modified Bt corn. Specifically, corn exports to Europe have been $8 million or less 
per year from 1999 to the present (FAS 2006). In 1998, the EU began passing regulations 
banning genetically modified crops; these regulations have become increasingly stringent over 
time. Yet the decline in sales preceded the regulation; it resulted from a widely-held, and well-
known, consumer preference in Europe, which corn growers and their seed suppliers ignored. 
 
A similar but larger loss occurred in meatpacking, when U.S. producers failed to respond 
to foreign consumers' fears of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease, 
with an appropriate, readily available level of testing. U.S. beef exports were around $3 billion 
annually from 2000 to 2003. Despite the enormous number of cattle slaughtered each year in the 
U.S. – 33 million in 2004 – U.S. testing for BSE has remained far below the European level. 
 
4 See also European Commission 2003; RPA 2003; Pedersen, et al. 2005; Pickvance, et al. 2005. 
5 All varieties of genetically-modified corn together amounted to 45 percent of the U.S. corn plantings in 2004 
(Nadal and Wise 2004). 
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  Before mid-2004, testing had never exceeded a rate of about 20,000 animals per year, 
representing only a small fraction of the high risk groups. Following the detection of two North 
American BSE cases in 2003, USDA introduced a new testing procedure in June 2004. A new, 
rapid screening test was adopted, and the pace of testing increased, reaching about 24,000 per 
month in the second half of 2004, and 30,000 per month (360,000 per year) thereafter. Yet even 
this record level of testing represents just over 1 percent of the cattle slaughtered annually in the 
U.S. – compared to 48 percent in Europe and 100 percent in Japan (USDA 2005). 
 
The discovery of mad cow disease in the U.S. in 2003 led to worldwide rejection of U.S. 
beef. Exports dropped to $550 million in 2004 and remained below $1 billion in 2005 (FAS 
2006). Japan, the largest export market for U.S. beef, and Britain, the country with the worst 
history of BSE, test every animal that is slaughtered; in contrast, U.S. regulators have insisted on 
testing only a small fraction of slaughtered cattle, and using different tests for BSE than Japan 
and many European countries. In 2004, Creekstone Farms, a Kansas beef producer, negotiated an 
agreement with the Japanese government to resume sales in Japan, if Creekstone voluntarily 
adopted Japanese BSE testing standards. However, the U.S. Department of Agriculture invoked 
old food safety laws to prohibit any American producer from exceeding U.S. government BSE 
testing standards! Over $2 billion of annual exports have been lost, all in order to maintain the 
principle that U.S. industry doesn’t need to meet other countries’ standards.
6
 
A smarter and happier ending occurred in the wheat industry, one of the most export-
dependent sectors of U.S. agriculture. Roughly half of the U.S. wheat crop is exported, with 
exports of wheat and wheat products to the EU-15 fluctuating around $200 million in recent 
years (FAS 2006). Monsanto, a leading supplier of seeds and agricultural chemicals, applied for 
permission to grow genetically-modified Roundup-Ready wheat in the U.S. and Canada in 
December 2002. Recognizing the threat to foreign markets, advocacy groups throughout wheat-
growing areas organized an effective campaign against genetically-modified wheat. The 
campaign quickly gained support from the Montana Legislature, the Canadian Wheat Board, and 
other major organizations in the region. In May 2004, Monsanto announced the withdrawal of its 
application to grow genetically-modified wheat (OCA 2006). 
 
The high price of failing to meet other countries’ health and safety regulations is 
painfully clear in the recent histories of the U.S. corn and beef industries: Genetically-modified 
crops mean a loss of access to foreign markets, and the prohibition on Japanese-level testing for 
mad cow disease has crippled the industry, including meatpackers that wanted to meet those 
regulations at their own expense.  
 
Wheat growers, in contrast, understood the importance of foreign markets and rejected a 
dubious innovation that would have jeopardized their export sales. As the U.S. faces the dilemma 
of a huge and mounting trade deficit, the conclusion must be that the wheat growers got it right, 
making the choices that maintained market access, while the corn and beef industries (and 




6 See “U.S. Won’t Let Company Test All Its Cattle for Mad Cow,” New York Times, April 10, 2004. 
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The costs of paying for REACH testing and registration, as estimated using the same 
ratio of costs to sales expected in Europe, are very small. The costs of non-compliance – of 
losing REACH exports just as U.S. markets for corn and beef lost their European sales – are 
enormous: Paying $14 million per year compared to losing $14 billion per year. Compliance 
with REACH also has added benefits to public health and occupation safety, especially for 
workers in the chemical industry. Failing to comply with REACH, on the other hand, exposes an 
important and growing sector of the U.S. economy to the total loss of its European trade – a 
lesson that should have been learned from the experience of U.S. corn growers and meatpackers.  
 
For some U.S. states, the impact of REACH is far greater than that on the nation’s 
chemical industry as a whole. Massachusetts in particular would risk losing 9,000 jobs and the 
highest percentage of REACH production of any state if industry fails to comply with REACH. 
Texas and California risk the loss of 6,000 and 5,000 jobs, respectively, and Louisiana, West 
Virginia and Kentucky are some of the states with the most to lose as a percentage of their total 
production. No state can afford to lose thousands of jobs, especially when regulatory costs equal 
to just a few hundred dollars per job could prevent it. 
 
With the help of the U.S. government, the U.S. chemical industry has demonstrated a 
great reluctance to specify safe conditions of use and appropriate risk management techniques 
for their products. Even if REACH is a mistake, it is a very inexpensive one. And if, on the other 
hand, REACH has the result of creating an efficient process for regulating dangerous substances 
and protecting the public health, the EU’s new regulations could pave the way for similar 
legislation in the U.S. and around the world. Far from posing any threat to the U.S. chemical 




Frank Ackerman is Director of the Research and Policy Program, Elizabeth Stanton is 
Researcher and Rachel Massey is Research Associate at the Global Development and 
Environment Institute, Tufts University; inquiries can be directed to Frank.Ackerman@tufts.edu, 
liz.stanton@tufts.edu, and rachel.massey@tufts.edu. 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
 
 
A.I. Data Definitions and Sources: 
 
Total Chemicals Employment (TCE): Total Chemicals Employment (TCE2002) for 2002 is the 
number of paid employees reported in the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, Industry Statistics 
Sampler, NAICS 325, Column 7. 
 
Indirect Employment Multiplier (IEM): The Indirect Employment Multiplier (IEM2001) is the 
ratio of the total (direct and indirect) chemicals manufacturing employment to direct chemicals 
manufacturing employment. Chemicals manufacturing, here and throughout, is defined as that 
portion of the U.S. manufacturing sector classified as category 325 under the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). Total and direct employment are for 2001 and are taken 
from a July 2004 U.S. Census Bureau report, “Exports from Manufacturing Establishments: 
2001”, Table 4, Columns 6 and 9 (for 325 only), which uses I/O accounts to derive indirect 
exports. According to this report, indirect employment is any employment associated with the 
intermediate goods and services necessary to manufacture exported goods. 
 
Share of 325 Production Exported to the EU-25, 2002 and 2004 (SEU): The share of 325 
production exported to the EU-25 (SEU2002/2002 and SEU2004/2002) is the ratio of the value of all 
325 exports to the EU-25 to total 325 value of shipments. The value of 325 exports to the EU-25, 
for 2002 and 2004, is taken from “TradeStats Express: State Export Data" from the Office of 
Trade and Industry Information, Manufacturing and Services, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. The total value of 325 shipments is available for 
2002 only, and is taken from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, Industry Statistics Sampler, 
NAICS 325, Column 4. 
 
Share of Production that is REACH-affected (SR): The share of production that is REACH-
affected (SR2002) is the ratio of the value of shipments for 2002 in the four-digit NAICS 
categories assumed to fall under REACH regulation (3251, 3255, 3256, and 3259) to the total 
325 value of shipments. The value of 325, 3251, 3255, 3256, and 3259 shipments is for 2002, 
and is taken from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, Industry Statistics Sampler, NAICS 325, 
Column 4. 
 
Value of REACH-affected Shipments (VRS): The value of REACH-affected shipments 
(VRS2002) is the sum of the value of shipments for 2002 in the four-digit NAICS categories 
assumed to fall under REACH regulation (3251, 3255, 3256, and 3259), and is taken from the 
2002 U.S. Economic Census, Industry Statistics Sampler, NAICS 325, Column 4. 
 
Total Employment, 2002 and 2004 (TE): Total Employment (TE2002 and TE2004) for 2002 and 
2004 is the number of non-farm employees and is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
State and Area Employment, Hours, and Earnings. 
 
Gross State Product, 2002 and 2004 (GSP): Gross state product (GSP2002 and GSP2004) for 2002 
and 2004 is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts. 
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1. Direct and Indirect Employment related to REACH-Exports, 2002 and 2004 (DIE) 
Direct and Indirect Employment related to REACH-exports for 2002 (DIE) is the product of total 
325 employment (TCE), the indirect employment multiplier (IEM), the share of 325 production 
exported to the EU-25 (SEU), and the share of production that is REACH-affected (SR).  
 
(1) DIE2002 = TCE2002 * IEM2001 * SEU2002/2002* SR2002 
 
(2) DIE2004 = TCE2002 * IEM2001 * SEU2004/2002* SR2002 
 
 
2. Direct and Indirect Employment related to REACH-Exports as a Percentage of Total 
Employment, 2002 and 2004 (%DIE) 
Direct and indirect employment related to REACH-exports as a percentage of total employment 
for 2002 (%DIE) is direct and indirect employment related to REACH-exports (DIE) divided by 
total employment (TE).  
 
DIE2002 (3) %DIE2002 = TE2002
 
DIE2004 (4) %DIE2004 = TE2004
 
 
3. Value of REACH-Exports, 2002 and 2004 (VRE) 
The value of REACH-exports for 2002 (VRE) is the product of the value of REACH-affected 
shipments (VRS) and the share of 325 production exported to the EU-25 (SEU).  
 
(5) VRE2002 = VRS2002 * SEU2002/2002 
 
(6) VRE2004 = VRS2002 * SEU2004/2002 
 
 
4. Value of REACH-Exports as a Percentage of Gross State Product, 2002 and 2004 (%VRE) 
The value of REACH-exports as a percentage of gross state product for 2002 (%VRE) is the 
value of REACH-exports (VRE) divided by gross state product (GSP).  
 
VRE2002 (7) %VRE2002 = GSP2002
 
VRE2004 (8) %VRE2004 = GSP2004
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Appendix B: Data 
 
Appendix Table B1: Employment and Value of Shipments related to REACH Exports (2002) 
Direct and Indirect 
Employment related to 325 
REACH Exports to the EU-25
as a percentage 
of Total 
Employment
Value of Shipments of 
325 REACH Exports to 
the EU-25
as a percentage 
of Gross State 
Product
Alabama 710 0.038% $164,000,000 0.133%
Arizona 130 0.006% $11,000,000 0.006%
Arkansas 320 0.028% $59,000,000 0.083%
California 5,140 0.036% $788,000,000 0.058%
Colorado 420 0.019% $51,000,000 0.028%
Connecticut 230 0.014% $59,000,000 0.036%
Delaware 140 0.034% $77,000,000 0.164%
Florida 270 0.004% $92,000,000 0.018%
Georgia 1,810 0.047% $568,000,000 0.185%
Illinois 1,800 0.031% $540,000,000 0.111%
Indiana 620 0.021% $233,000,000 0.114%
Iowa 10 0.001% $9,000,000 0.009%
Kansas 290 0.021% $70,000,000 0.078%
Kentucky 1,530 0.085% $374,000,000 0.307%
Louisiana 700 0.037% $517,000,000 0.385%
Maine 70 0.012% $9,000,000 0.022%
Maryland 720 0.029% $161,000,000 0.080%
Massachusetts 3,440 0.106% $598,000,000 0.208%
Michigan 2,290 0.051% $369,000,000 0.106%
Minnesota 740 0.028% $92,000,000 0.046%
Mississippi 480 0.043% $127,000,000 0.185%
Missouri 590 0.022% $179,000,000 0.096%
Nebraska 90 0.010% $21,000,000 0.035%
Nevada 20 0.002% $6,000,000 0.007%
New Hampshire 160 0.026% $10,000,000 0.022%
New Jersey 2,260 0.057% $651,000,000 0.172%
New Mexico 0 0.001% $1,000,000 0.002%
New York 1,520 0.018% $639,000,000 0.080%
North Carolina 510 0.013% $139,000,000 0.046%
Ohio 1,840 0.034% $386,000,000 0.100%
Oklahoma 60 0.004% $20,000,000 0.021%
Oregon 480 0.030% $75,000,000 0.065%
Pennsylvania 390 0.007% $144,000,000 0.034%
Rhode Island 550 0.115% $39,000,000 0.104%
South Carolina 1,800 0.100% $242,000,000 0.198%
Tennessee 1,470 0.055% $276,000,000 0.144%
Texas 3,610 0.038% $1,792,000,000 0.231%
Utah 110 0.010% $23,000,000 0.031%
Virginia 590 0.017% $192,000,000 0.067%
Washington 330 0.012% $47,000,000 0.020%
West Virginia 410 0.056% $142,000,000 0.313%
Wisconsin 590 0.021% $157,000,000 0.083%
Wyoming 30 0.013% $22,000,000 0.107%
43 states 39,280 0.031% $10,169,000,000 0.100%  
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix A for data sources. 
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Appendix Table B2: Employment and Value of Shipments related to REACH Exports (2004) 
Direct and Indirect 
Employment related to 325 
REACH Exports to the EU-25
as a percentage 
of Total 
Employment
Value of Shipments of 
325 REACH Exports 
to the EU-25
as a percentage 
of Gross State 
Product
Alabama 690 0.036% $159,000,000 0.114%
Arizona 210 0.009% $18,000,000 0.009%
Arkansas 450 0.039% $82,000,000 0.101%
California 6,330 0.044% $971,000,000 0.063%
Colorado 510 0.023% $62,000,000 0.031%
Connecticut 290 0.017% $75,000,000 0.040%
Delaware 130 0.030% $69,000,000 0.128%
Florida 300 0.004% $102,000,000 0.017%
Georgia 1,830 0.047% $575,000,000 0.168%
Illinois 2,860 0.049% $856,000,000 0.164%
Indiana 1,080 0.037% $405,000,000 0.178%
Iowa 10 0.001% $9,000,000 0.008%
Kansas 230 0.018% $57,000,000 0.057%
Kentucky 1,950 0.108% $477,000,000 0.349%
Louisiana 880 0.046% $651,000,000 0.425%
Maine 40 0.007% $5,000,000 0.012%
Maryland 790 0.032% $179,000,000 0.079%
Massachusetts 9,110 0.286% $1,581,000,000 0.497%
Michigan 2,200 0.050% $355,000,000 0.095%
Minnesota 1,640 0.061% $204,000,000 0.091%
Mississippi 610 0.054% $159,000,000 0.209%
Missouri 1,020 0.038% $313,000,000 0.154%
Nebraska 100 0.011% $24,000,000 0.035%
Nevada 10 0.001% $4,000,000 0.004%
New Hampshire 110 0.018% $7,000,000 0.014%
New Jersey 2,470 0.062% $714,000,000 0.172%
New Mexico 30 0.003% $7,000,000 0.011%
New York 1,690 0.020% $710,000,000 0.079%
North Carolina 970 0.025% $263,000,000 0.078%
Ohio 2,610 0.048% $547,000,000 0.130%
Oklahoma 60 0.004% $19,000,000 0.018%
Oregon 470 0.029% $73,000,000 0.057%
Pennsylvania 520 0.009% $191,000,000 0.041%
Rhode Island 410 0.084% $29,000,000 0.069%
South Carolina 1,880 0.103% $253,000,000 0.186%
Tennessee 1,850 0.068% $347,000,000 0.159%
Texas 4,870 0.051% $2,418,000,000 0.274%
Utah 170 0.016% $37,000,000 0.045%
Virginia 840 0.024% $274,000,000 0.083%
Washington 320 0.012% $46,000,000 0.018%
West Virginia 580 0.079% $201,000,000 0.407%
Wisconsin 550 0.020% $148,000,000 0.070%
Wyoming 60 0.022% $39,000,000 0.164%
43 states 53,780 0.042% $13,716,000,000 0.118%  
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix A for data sources. 
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